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Limited Liability for Limited
Partners: An Argument for the
Abolition of the Control Rule
Joseph J. Basile, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the important features of the limited partnership' that
makes investment in this form of business organization attractive
is the general immunity afforded to limited partners from liability
for the obligations of the partnership.2 This immunity, however,
can be forfeited. Under both the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA) and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA),3 a limited partner becomes liable for the obligations of
C 1985 Joseph J. Basile, Jr., and Vanderbilt Law Review.
*Associate Professor, Western New England College School of Law. A.B. 1974,
Stonehill College; J.D. 1977, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Howard I.
Kalodner, Dean and Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, for
making available funds for the research for this article, and Philip H. Harris and Antoinette
J. Yitchinsky, members of the Western New England College School of Law classes of 1985
and 1986, respectively, for their assistance with that research.
1. A limited partnership is a partnership having as members one or more general part-
ners and one or more limited partners. UNIF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 1 (1916) (act su-
perseded 1976), 6 U.L.A. 562 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ULPA]; REVISED UNis. LIMrED
PARTNERSHIP Ac § 101(7) (1976), 6 U.L.A. 217 (West Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
RULPA].
2. See ULPA § 1, 6 U.L.A. 562 (1969); RULPA § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 245-46 (West Supp.
1985). By contrast, the general partners of a limited partnership are liable for the obliga-
tions of the partnership. ULPA § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 586 (1969); RULPA § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 254
(West Supp. 1985).
In addition to offering the allure of limited liability, a limited partnership can be an
attractive investment vehicle because the drafter "of a limited partnership agreement has a
degree of flexibility in defining the relations among the partners that is not available in the
corporate form." Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the RULPA, 6 U.L.A. 200 (West Supp.
1985). Moreover, unlike corporations, limited partnerships are not subject to federal income
tax. The partners are liable for federal income tax "only in their separate or individual
capacities." I.R.C. § 701 (1982).
3. The ULPA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (the Commissioners) in 1916. In 1976 the Commissioners approved the RULPA
with the intention of modernizing the ULPA. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 6 U.L.A.
200 (West Supp. 1985). As of January 1, 1985, 27 states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands had adopted and not repealed the ULPA, and 22 states had adopted
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the partnership if, in addition to the exercise of the rights and
powers of a limited partner, the limited partner "takes part in the
control of the business.
''4
Not surprisingly, when sophisticated investors are offered lim-
ited partnership interests,5 these investors often request provisions
in the certificate of limited partnership or the partnership agree-
ment' providing that the general partners may commit the part-
nership to certain types of transactions only with the consent of
the holders of some specified percentage of the limited partnership
interests7 or that the limited partners be given some voice in the
the RULPA. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted either the ULPA or the
RULPA.
4. ULPA § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969); RULPA § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 245-46 (West Supp.
1985). In addition, a limited partner may become liable to creditors of the partnership
under certain circumstances if the limited partner's name appears in the partnership name,
ULPA § 5(2), 6 U.L.A. 580 (1969); RULPA § 303(d), 6 U.L.A. 246 (West Supp. 1985), or if
the limited partner executes a certificate of limited partnership that contains a false state-
ment, ULPA § 6, 6 U.L.A. 581 (1969); RULPA § 207(1), 6 U.L.A. 241 (West Supp. 1985).
The issues raised by the rules imposing liability on a limited partner in these cases are
beyond the scope of this Article.
In August 1985 the Commissioners approved certain amendments to the RULPA, in-
cluding amendments to § 303. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Throughout
this Article, "section 303" and "former section 303" mean § 303 of the RULPA as approved
by the Commissioners in 1976, and "new section 303" means § 303 of the 1985 amendments.
Under new § 303(a), a limited partner becomes liable for the obligations of the partnership
if the limited partner "participates in the control of the business." See infra note 71 and
accompanying text.
5. A partnership interest is a partner's share of the profits and losses of a limited
partnership and the right to receive distributions of partnership assets. RULPA § 101(10), 6
U.L.A. 217 (West Supp. 1985). In this Article, all references to "investors" in limited part-
nerships mean purchasers of limited partnership interests rather than persons who make
loans to limited partnerships.
6. A certificate of limited partnership is a document containing certain information
prescribed by statute, the filing of which in a designated public office is required for the
formation of a limited partnership. See ULPA § 2, 6 U.L.A. 568 (1969); RULPA § 201, 6
U.L.A. 230 (West Supp. 1985). A partnership agreement is an agreement of the partners
concerning the affairs of the partnership and the conduct of its business. See RULPA
§ 101(9), 6 U.L.A. 217 (West Supp. 1985). Although a certificate of limited partnership is
technically a partnership agreement, most limited partnerships have a separate partnership
agreement that contains terms not required to be set forth in the certificate. Although pro-
visions limiting a general partner's management authority could be included in either the
certificate of limited partnership or in a separate partnership agreement, this Article gener-
ally treats these provisions as being set forth in the partnership agreement.
7. Indeed, the securities laws of a number of states require that the partnership agree-
ments of certain types of limited partnerships contain these provisions before state residents
may be invited to invest in the limited partnerships. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R.
260.140.116.2, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11,999 (Apr. 1984); MICHIGAN CORPORAION AND
SECURITIES BUREAU, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING LIMITED AND CERTAIN QUALIFIED OF-
FERINGS OF REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIPSIPROGRAMS, pt. VII, para. B, 1A BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) T 32,569 (Feb. 1985); Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-52.180, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
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selection of the partnership's managers. Although these requests
are understandable, an obvious tension arises between the limited
partners' desire to exercise control over important decisions affect-
ing the partnership and the threat of personal liability for taking
part, or participating, in the control of the business of the partner-
ship. One of the most vexing problems facing lawyers who re-
present sophisticated limited partnership investors is advising
these investors how much decision-making power they can obtain
through negotiation with the general partners without losing im-
munity from liability for the obligations of the partnership.
There has been no dearth of insightful commentary pointing
out the uncertainty inherent in the control rule. Most of this com-
mentary has attempted to suggest the appropriate judicial stan-
dards for deciding whether the particular conduct of a limited
partner in relation to the partnership business should subject the
limited partner to personal liability for the obligations of the part-
nership.8 Few commentators, however, have had the temerity even
to suggest that the control rule be abolished 9 and that limited
partners have no personal liability for the obligations of the part-
nership regardless of the degree to which the limited partners par-
ticipate in the control of the partnership business.
This Article presses that argument. Part II examines the ori-
gins and present status of the control rule. This examination ex-
poses the uncertain boundaries of a limited partner's potential lia-
bility under the rule and the resulting difficulty of advising
potential investors in limited partnerships. Part III criticizes the
control rule on the grounds that it complicates a potential inves-
tor's calculation of the risk of investing in a limited partnership,
T 35,468 (Apr. 1985); NEB. ADMIN. R. 64, pt. VII(b), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 37,411
(May, 1980); TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 117.7, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55,607 (July
1985); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 460-32A-150, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) % 61,673 (Apr. 1983).
See generally Augustine, Fass, Lester & Robinson, The Liability of Limited Partners Hav-
ing Certain Statutory Voting Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the Partnership, 31
Bus. LAw. 2087 (1976) (examining when a voting rights provision subjects a limited partner
to personal liability for "taking part in the control of the partnership business"); Comment,
Partnership: Can Rights Required To Be Given Limited Partners Under New Tax Shelter
Investment Regulations Be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act?, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 289 (1973) (discussing what legal and practical effects the require-
ment of certain control rights will have on a limited partner's liability for the obligations of
a partnership).
8. See, e.g., Abrams, Imposing Liability for "Control" Under Section 7 of the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 785 (1978); Feld, The "Control"
Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1471 (1969); Feldman, The Limited Part-
ner's Participation in the Control of the Partnership Business, 50 CONN. B.J. 168 (1976).
9. But see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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compromises the negotiating position of limited partners relative
to general partners, and is not supported by any valid policy that
could not be accommodated by other existing legal principles. Fi-
nally, part IV argues that the control rule should be abolished in
favor of a rule that generally would free limited partners from per-
sonal liability for the obligations of the partnership. Part IV also
suggests specific legislation that would effect this change.
II. ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE CONTROL RULE
A. The Early Limited Partnership Acts
The first limited partnership act in the United States was
adopted by New York in 1822 and was copied largely from the
then-extant French statute.10 Within the following sixty years, all
the states adopted limited partnership acts" based generally upon
the New York model.
12
Most of the early limited partnership acts provided that a lim-
ited partner could neither "transact any business on account of the
partnership, nor be employed for that purpose as agent, attorney,
or otherwise."' 3 If a limited partner acted contrary to these
prohibitions, the limited partner was deemed a general partner.'
4
Thus, under the early acts, the test of a limited partner's personal
liability for the obligations of the partnership was whether the lim-
ited partner "interfered" with the general partner's management of
the partnership business. The drafters of these statutes, however,
made no attempt to define the type of conduct that would consti-
tute "interference" by a limited partner. When partnership credi-
tors claimed that limited partners had "interfered" in violation of
the acts, the courts were required to decide each case on its own
facts.
Although the results of the early cases were mixed, generally,
the greater the quantum of the limited partner's participation in
the business of the partnership, the greater the likelihood that the
limited partner would be held liable for the obligations of the part-
nership. For example, limited partners were held not to be liable
10. C. BATES, THE LAW OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 20 (1886).
11. Id. at 21.
12. ULPA § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. 563 (1969).
13. C. BATEs, supra note 10, at 129.
14. Id. Some early limited partnership statutes provided that a limited partner would
be "deemed and treated as a general partner" if the limited partner personally made "any
contract respecting the concerns of the partnership with any person except the general part-
ners." Id. at 131.
1202 [Vol. 38:1199
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for the obligations of partnerships when: title to real estate was
taken in the name of two general partners and a limited partner,
but the evidence did not show that the limited partner partici-
pated in the conveyance or knew that he was named as a grantee
in the deed; 15 a limited partner conducted the sale of partnership
assets after dissolution;16 a limited partner agreed to the proposed
terms of the partnership's dissolution;17 a limited partner pur-
chased goods from and sold goods to the partnership and per-
formed an occasional errand for the partnership;' a limited part-
ner on one occasion "consulted with one of the general partners"
and telegraphed persons who requested information about the
partnership to the effect that the firm was "all right"; 9 a limited
partner guaranteed certain obligations of the partnership;20 a lim-
ited partner sold goods to the partnership;2' a limited partner
brought an action for partnership dissolution and was appointed
receiver; 22 and a limited partner, following the illness of the gen-
eral partner, looked over the business, examined the books of the
partnership, and stated that he expected to close out the business
to pay off the creditors.23 On the other hand, limited partners were
held liable for the obligations of partnerships when: the partner-
ship agreement provided that the partnership was to employ a son
of the limited partner as a bookkeeper and that the general part-
ner could sign no notes, checks, or contracts on behalf of the part-
nership without the bookkeeper's approval;2 4 the general partners
transferred all the partnership assets to a limited partner and the
limited partner thereafter carried on the business in his own
name;2 5 a limited partner was a party to a contract transferring all
the assets of an insolvent partnership to a creditor and made a
contract with the creditor regarding disposal of the assets and pay-
15. Madison County Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill 309, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
16. Lawson v. Wilmer, 3 Phila. 122, 15 Leg. Int. 133, 133 (Phila. Common P1. 1858);
Outcalt & Co. v. Burnet & Brother, 1 Handy 404, 405 (Ohio 1855).
17. Lachaise v. Marks, 4 E.D. Smith 610, 619 (N.Y. Common P1. 1855).
18. McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. 156, 162-63 (1863).
19. Ulman & Co. v. Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 655, 662 (1880).
20. R. W. Rayne & Co. v. Terrell, 33 La. Ann. 812, 814 (1881).
21. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Sirrett, 15 Abb. N. Cas. 334, 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883).
22. Continental Nat'1 Bank v. Strauss, 137 N.Y. 148, 150, 32 N.E. 1066, 1066 (1893).
23. E. C. Cropper & Co. v. Illinois Sewing Mach. Co., 100 Miss. 127, 128, 54 So. 849,
849 (1911).
24. Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa. 153, 156 (1861).
25. First Nat'l Bank v. Whitney, 4 Lans. 34, 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), aff'd mem. sub
noma. Flour City Nat'l Bank v. Whitney, 53 N.Y. 627 (1873).
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ment of the partnership's debts;2 6 and a partnership agreement
provided that the business of the partnership would be managed
by directors elected by the limited partners.
More interesting than the results of these cases are the occa-
sional explanations by the courts for the statutory command that
personal liability is the price limited partners must pay for "inter-
ference." Although few of the early jurists ventured a guess at the
reason behind this rule, those who did explained that the rule was
intended to protect creditors who otherwise might assume mistak-
enly that a limited partner who "interfered" in the management of
the business was a general partner. For example, in Lawson v.
Wilmer2 8 the court stated: "The design [of the statute], no doubt,
was to protect third persons, who were ignorant of the relations
between the members of the partnership, and who might be led by
the presence and intervention of the special partner, to believe
that he was personally liable for the debts of the firm. '2 9 Similarly,
in Hanover National Bank v. Sirrett3° the court said:
The interference by transacting business or acting as agent for the firm, upon
which the penalty of liability as a general partner is imposed by the statute,
means an interference by intrusion into the office of a general partner, and
the performance of acts that pertain to the office of the general partner, and
which might therefore deceive the public with the idea that he who so ap-
pears to be, is in fact a general partner.-1
A discussion of the validity of this reason for imposing personal
liability on limited partners appears in part III of this Article.
B. The Control Rule Under the ULPA
In 1916 the Commissioners approved the ULPA and recom-
mended its adoption by the legislatures of the several states. The
principal drafter of the ULPA, Professor William Draper Lewis,
stated that the Commissioners' purpose in approving the ULPA
was to respond to the perceived "failure of the [early] limited part-
nership acts to meet the business need for which they were
designed. '3 2 Professor Lewis wrote that most of the differences be-
26. Farnsworth v. Boardman, 131 Mass. 115, 120 (1881).
27. Strang v. Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 601, 91 N.W. 237, 238 (1902).
28. 3 Phila. 122, 15 Leg. Int. 133 (Phila. Common P1. 1858).
29. Id. at 123, 15 Leg. Int. at 133. The reference in the opinion to the limited partner
as a "special partner" is typical of the terminology of the early statutes and cases.
30. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883).
31. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
32. Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 718 (1917). In
the Official Comment to § 1 of the ULPA, the Commissioners stated that the "business
1204 [Vol. 38:1199
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tween the ULPA and the existing statutes reflected the drafters'
desire to provide limited partners "with the same sense of security
from any possibility of unlimited liability as the subscribers to the
shares of a corporation."33 Professor Lewis further noted:
The act proceeds on the assumption that no public policy requires a per-
son who contributes to the capital of a business, acquires an interest in the
profits, and some degree of control over the conduct of the business, to be-
come bound for the obligations of the business, provided creditors have no
reason to believe at the times their credits were extended that such person
was so bound.
3 '
If, as Professor Lewis wrote, the Commissioners intended that
limited partners be allowed to acquire some control over the busi-
ness of the partnership without risk of incurring personal liability
for the obligations of the partnership, the Commissioners chose an
odd way to effect that intent. Rather than abolishing the interfer-
ence rule, the Commissioners provided a substitute rule in section
7 of the ULPA: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a
general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and
powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the
business. Thus, on its face, section 7 states the antithesis of the
Commissioners' purported intent.
Just as the drafters of the early limited partnership acts did
not define "interference," the Commissioners did not define "takes
part in the control of the business" for purposes of section 7. Thus,
the Commissioners left to the courts the task of divining the mean-
ing of this phrase. While struggling with this problem, courts de-
veloped two basic tests for deciding when to impose liability on a
limited partner for the obligations of the partnership.36
1. The Quantitative Power Test
In most of the reported decisions, courts decided whether to
hold a limited partner liable for the obligations of the partnership
reason for the adoption of acts making provisions for limited or special partners is that men
in business often desire to secure capital from others," and that the early limited partner-
ship acts failed "to meet the desire of the owners of a business to secure necessary capital
under the existing limited partnership form of business association." 6 U.L.A. 562, 564
(1969).
33. Lewis, supra note 32, at 723.
34. Id. (emphasis added). This view is also stated in the Commissioners' Official Com-
ment to § 1 of the ULPA. 6 U.L.A. 564 (1969).
35. 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969).
36. For a comprehensive analysis of the reported decisions under § 7 of the ULPA and




by assaying the amount of the limited partner's involvement in the
partnership's business: when the limited partner's involvement be-
came too extensive, the limited partner was held personally liable.
One commentator has described this test as the "quantitative
power" test.
3 7
Two cases from California illustrate the operation of the quan-
titative power test. The first, Holzman v. de Escamilla,3 con-
cerned a limited partnership engaged in the business of raising
vegetables for market. The partnership consisted of one general
partner and two limited partners. The evidence showed that the
three partners always conferred on what crops to plant and that
sometimes the limited partners dictated the choice of crops over
the dissent of the general partner. In addition, the partnership
maintained two bank accounts upon which checks could be drawn
only with the signatures of two partners; the general partner,
therefore, could draw checks only with the signature of a limited
partner but the limited partners could draw checks without the
signature of the general partner. Finally, the limited partners re-
quested that the general partner resign as the manager of the part-
nership business, and they appointed a new manager. After sum-
ming up the evidence, the court held that the circumstances
"clearly" showed that the limited partners "took part in the con-
trol of the business of the partnership and thus became liable as
general partners."3 9
The second California case applying the quantitative power
test, Grainger v. Antoyan,40 concerned a limited partnership en-
gaged in the business of selling automobiles. Like the limited part-
nership in Holzman, the entity consisted of one general partner
and two limited partners. The defendant limited partner was the
sales manager of the limited partnership and was in charge of the
new car sales department. In addition, the limited partner was au-
thorized to cosign checks drawn on the partnership's checking ac-
count with the general partner and two employees of the partner-
ship. The limited partner, however, cosigned checks only when the
general partner was unavailable, and checks could be drawn on the
partnership's account without the limited partner's signature. The
limited partner had no authority to hire or fire employees, to
purchase new cars, to set selling prices of new or used cars or
37. Abrams, supra note 8, at 791.
38. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
39. Id. at 860, 195 P.2d at 834.
40. 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
1206 [Vol. 38:1199
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trade-in allowances for used cars, to extend credit to customers, to
operate the service department, or to maintain the partnership's
books. The Supreme Court of California summarily concluded that
the limited partner's activities did not subject him to liability
under section 7. The Grainger court found this case factually dis-
tinguishable from Holzman "for the reason that in the present case
defendant did not exercise control over the partnership, while in
[Holzman] the limited partners in fact exercised control over the
partnership. 4 1 Although the court was correct in saying that Holz-
man and Grainger were "factually distinguishable," neither deci-
sion is helpful to a California lawyer whose client is pressing for an
articulation of the boundary beyond which a limited partner may
not go without incurring liability for the obligations of the
partnership.
An examination of other opinions that have employed the
quantitative power test demonstrates further the problem that this
test presents for a lawyer.42 The test leads to decisions that form
41. Id. at 813, 313 P.2d at 853.
42. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959) (holding limited
partners not liable for the obligations of a partnership when the partnership agreement
named an individual as general sales manager of the partnership and provided for the
purchase of the interests of certain limited partners if the employment of that individual
were terminated by the general partner), aff'g Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Eisenberg, 170 F.
Supp. 100 (D. Mass. 1959); Mursor Builders, Inc. v. Crown Mountain Apartment Assocs.,
467 F. Supp. 1316 (D.V.I. 1978) (holding limited partners liable for the obligations of the
partnership when they were also officers of the corporate general partner of the partner-
ship); Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 170 F. Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958) (holding limited
partners liable for the obligations of a partnership that was formed to organize an insurance
company and to receive commissions on sales of policies by the insurance company when the
limited partners served as directors of the insurance company), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959); Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo.
522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954) (en banc) (holding a limited partner not liable for the obligations
of a partnership when that limited partner acted as a foreman in the partnership's automo-
bile repair shop and sometimes gave his opinion on business questions when asked by the
general partner); Stone Mountain Properties, Ltd. v. Helmer, 139 Ga. App. 865, 229 S.E.2d
779 (1976) (holding limited partners not liable for the obligations of a partnership when
they merely indicated their desire to sell or not to sell certain unspecified items); Trans-Am
Builders, Inc. v. Woods Mill, Ltd., 133 Ga. App. 411, 210 S.E.2d 866 (1974) (holding limited
partners not liable for the obligations of a partnership when they attended meetings with
the general partner at which financial difficulties were discussed, visited a project owned by
the partnership, and complained to the general contractor's superintendent about the way
certain work was done); Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975) (holding
limited partners liable for the obligations of the partnership when they were also officers of
the corporate general partner); see also Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. 394, 323 A.2d 371
(1974) (reversing summary judgment in favor of two limited partners employed by a part-
nership as consultants and having the title of "project managers"). According to Abrams,
the court in Gast actually applied a refinement of the "quantitative power" test, which
Abrams called the "day-to-day powers" test. Under this test a court would hold a limited
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no discernible pattern and that are nearly useless in predicting the
outcome of the next case. To purloin a sentence from another con-
text, "[i]f there is any silver thread of consistency running through
these decisions, it has escaped the observation of this writer.
'43
Under the quantitative power approach, once a limited part-
ner's activity crosses some metaphysical threshold, liability is auto-
matic. Whether a creditor relied upon the limited partner's con-
duct and mistook the limited partner for a general partner or even
knew of the limited partner's conduct at the time the creditor ex-
tended credit to the partnership is therefore irrelevent. In Delaney
v. Fidelity Lease Ltd.,44 for example, the Texas Supreme Court ex-
plicitly rejected the limited partners' contention that section 7 of
the ULPA required that the court determine "whether the plain-
tiffs relied upon the limited partners as holding themselves out as
general partners. '45 The court reasoned from the absence of any
explicit mention of a reliance test in section 7 that reliance by the
plaintiffs was not part of the control rule.46
2. The Specific Reliance Test
On the other hand, in a few reported cases arising under sec-
tion 7 of the ULPA, courts have applied what one commentator
has called the "specific reliance" test.47 Courts that have accepted
this test have explained that liability for a partnership's obliga-
tions to a creditor should not be imposed upon a limited partner
who takes part in the control of the business unless, as a result of
partner liable for the obligations of the partnership if the limited partner's conduct consti-
tuted the continual, day-to-day exercise of power over the operation of partnership affairs.
See Abrams, supra note 8, at 793-99.
43. Prosser, Open Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 16 MINN. L. REv. 733, 736
n.6 (1932).
44. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
45. Id. at 545. The limited partners argued:
[B]efore personal liability attaches to limited partners, two elements must coincide: (1)
the limited partner must take part in the control of the business, and (2) the limited
partner must have held himself out as being a general partner having personal liability
to an extent that the third party, or plaintiff, relied upon the limited partners' personal
liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. Id. The opinion states:
Section 8 of Article 6132a simply provides that a limited partner who takes part in the
control of the business subjects himself to personal liability as a general partner. The
statute makes no mention of any requirement of reliance on the part of the party at-
tempting to hold the limited partner personally liable.
Id.
47. Abrams, supra note 8, at 799-802.
1208 [Vol. 38:1199
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the limited partner's conduct, the creditor believed that the lim-
ited partner was a general partner.48 The justification advanced for
requiring a creditor to show reliance is that the purpose of impos-
ing liability on a limited partner under section 7 is to "protect
third parties from dealing with the partnership under the mistaken
assumption that the limited partner is a general partner with gen-
eral liability. '49 Regardless of the merits of the specific reliance
test,50 the Texas Supreme Court correctly pointed out in the Dela-
ney decision 51 that section 7 does not by its terms require creditor
reliance as a predicate for holding a limited partner liable.2
Despite the fact that the Commissioners approved the ULPA
nearly seventy years ago and that at one time forty-nine states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands had adopted
the Act, there is amazingly little reported case law interpreting sec-
tion 7.53 Nonetheless, analysis of the few existing decisions lends
weight to the conclusion expressed by one appellate court that
48. Perhaps it is more than coincidental that no court that has used the specific reli-
ance test has held a limited partner liable for the obligations of the partnership under § 7 of
the ULPA. See Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enters., 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 138
Cal. Rptr. 918 (1977); Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974),
rev'd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash.
2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
49. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 634, 641, 544 P.2d
781, 785 (1975), aff'd, 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
50. Section 5 of the ULPA makes a limited partner whose surname appears in the
partnership name "liable as a general partner to partnership creditors who extend credit to
the partnership without actual knowledge that [the limited partner] is not a general part-
ner." 6 U.L.A. 580 (1969). Similarly, § 6 of the ULPA makes any partner who knows that
the certificate of limited partnership contains a false statement liable to "one who suffers
loss by reliance on such statement." 6 U.L.A. 581 (1969). By contrast, § 7 does not by its
terms make the state of mind of a creditor an element of the creditor's claim. Feld, supra
note 8, at 1479-80.
51. See supra note 46. After the Delaney decision the Texas legislature amended the
state's version of § 7 to provide that a limited partner who takes part in the control of the
business is liable "only to a person who transacts business with the partnership reasonably
believing that the limited partner is a general partner." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a,
§ 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
52. Various commentators have suggested other tests that might be applied to deter-
mine liability under § 7 of the ULPA. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 808-24 (advocating an
"effects" test); Feld, supra note 8, at 1480 (suggesting an "estoppel" test). Courts have not
embraced these suggestions.
53. The cases cited supra in notes 38, 40, 42, & 48 are all the reported decisions con-
struing § 7 when the plaintiff was a partnership creditor. Cf. Weil v. Diversified Properties,
319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that a general partner may not invoke § 7 of the
ULPA to enlarge the liability of the limited partners). According to Professor Feld, this
scarcity of reported decisions is a reflection of the chilling effect that § 7 has had on limited
partners and their counsel who might, but for the control rule, negotiate more aggressively
for input into certain business decisions. See Feld, supra note 8, at 1484.
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each case was decided on its own facts and provides little assis-
tance in formulating rules or standards. The court concluded:
In each case, it was not the position of the limited partner that was stated as
permissible, but the actual role and degree of participation that each had in
relation to the general partner. A reading of those cases reinforces the belief
of this Court that the determination must be made on an ad hoc basis. ... 54
C. The Control Rule Under the RULPA
1. Section 303
In 1976 the Commissioners approved the RULPA and recom-
mended its adoption by the legislatures of the several states.5 Ac-
cording to the Commissioners' Comment to section 303 of the
RULPA, the provision "makes several important changes in Sec-
tion 7 of the prior uniform law."'5 6 Although section 303 of the
RULPA is undoubtedly an improvement over section 7 of the
ULPA, section 303 is not without its own problems.5 7
Section 303(a) contains two sentences. The first sentence reit-
erates the control rule of section 7 of the ULPA.5 s The second sen-
tence identifies two classes of potential creditor-plaintiffs to whom
a limited partner may be liable: those who know of the limited
partner's participation in the control of the business and those who
do not. The consequence of this distinction is a bifurcated stan-
dard of liability for the limited partner: "[I]f the limited partner's
participation in the control of the business is not substantially the
same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable
only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership
with actual knowledge of his participation in control. 5 9 The Coin-
54. Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. 394, 402, 323 A.2d 371, 375 (1974).
55. The adoption process is well under way. See supra note 3.
56. 6 U.L.A. 246 (West Supp. 1985).
57. For a penetrating analysis and critique of § 303 of the RULPA, see Hecker, The
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act: Provisions Affecting the Relationship of the
Firm and Its Members To Third Parties, 27 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 47-60 (1978).
58. The first sentence of § 303(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the obligations
of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to the exer-
cise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the
business.
6 U.L.A. 245-46 (West Supp. 1985). Section 303(d), which is referred to in § 303(a), states
that a limited partner who knowingly permits his or her name to be used in the name of the
limited partnership, except under certain circumstances, is "liable to creditors who extend
credit to the limited partnership without actual knowledge that the limited partner is not a
general partner." Id. at 246.
59. Id. at 246.
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missioners' Comment to section 303 explains the rationale for this
distinction:
The first sentence of Section 303(a) carries over the basic test from former
Section 7-whether the limited partner "takes part in the control of the busi-
ness"-in order to insure that judicial decisions under the prior uniform law
remain applicable to the extent not expressly changed. The second sentence
of Section 303(a) reflects a wholly new concept. Because of the difficulty of
determining when the "control" line has been overstepped, it was thought it
[sic] unfair to impose general partner's liability on a limited partner except to
the extent that a third party had knowledge of his participation in control of
the business. On the other hand, in order to avoid permitting a limited part-
ner to exercise all of the powers of a general partner while avoiding any direct
dealings with third parties, the "is not substantially the same as" test was
introduced. 0
Under section 303, therefore, a limited partner who takes part
in the control of the partnership's business is potentially liable to
all the creditors of the partnership if the limited partner's partici-
pation is "substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a
general partner." This "substantially the same as" test is a new
concept, and its meaning is not evident from either the text of sec-
tion 303 or the Commissioners' Comments." In 1976 the Commis-
sioners, therefore, presented yet another amorphous concept with
which the courts must struggle; the results of the struggle have not
yet begun to appear in the reporters.
A limited partner may incur liability to a smaller group of
creditors-those with knowledge of the limited partner's participa-
tion in partnership control-even if the limited partner's participa-
tion does not rise to the level of being "substantially the same as
the exercise of the powers of a general partner. '6 2 Significantly, the
terms of the statute do not require, as a condition to a limited
partner's liability, that a creditor have mistaken the limited part-
ner for a general partner. The only requirement is that the creditor
have "actual knowledge" of the limited partner's participation in
60. Id.
61. Courts may well apply the "day-to-day powers" test described by Abrams to deter-
mine whether a limited partner's participation in the control of the business is "substan-
tially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner" for purposes of § 303(a).
See supra note 42.
62. If the Commissioners intend that the courts employ the "day-to-day powers" test
to determine the liability of a limited partner to a creditor who has no knowledge of the
limited partner's participation in the control of the business, see supra note 61, then pre-
sumably the Commissioners intend that a limited partner who participates in the control of
the business without meeting the "day-to-day powers" test nonetheless can be liable to a
creditor of the partnership who has actual knowledge of the limited partner's participation
in control.
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control.6
3
Section 303(b) of the RULPA then provides a nonexclusive"
list of safe harbor activities65 in which a limited partner may en-
gage without being deemed to have participated in the control of
the business. The safe harbor rules allow a limited partner to be a
contractor, agent, or employee of the partnership or of a general
partner; to consult with and advise a general partner; to be a
surety for the partnership; to approve or disapprove amendments
to the partnership agreement; and to vote on matters concerning
the dissolution and winding up of the partnership, the transfer of
all or substantially all the partnership's assets not in the ordinary
course of business, the incurrence of partnership indebtedness not
in the ordinary course of business, a change in the nature of the
partnership's business, or the removal of a general partner.6
63. In this respect, the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the RULPA, which states
that § 303 imposes liability only upon a limited partner who is in effect a "silent general
partner" or who has "somehow permitted third parties to be misled to their detriment as to
the limited partner's true status," is inconsistent with the terms of the statute. 6 U.L.A. 201
(West Supp. 1985). By comparison, the second sentence of the Delaware version of § 303(a)
provides that "if the limited partner does participate in the control of the business, he is
liable only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believ-
ing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (Supp. 1984); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632(a) (West
Supp. 1985) (providing that a limited partner is "not liable to persons who transact business
with the limited partnership unless they do so with actual knowledge of that partner's par-
ticipation in control and reasonably believing that partner to be a general partner").
64. That the provisions of § 303(b) of the RULPA are nonexclusive is made clear by
§ 303(c), which provides: "The enumeration in subsection (b) does not mean that the pos-
session or exercise of any other powers by a limited partner constitutes participation by him
in the business of the limited partnership." 6 U.L.A. 246 (West Supp. 1985).
65. The safe harbor approach to the problem of defining control is not unique to those
states that have enacted the RULPA. A few of the states in which the ULPA remains in
effect have enacted nonuniform variations of § 7 providing that certain specified activities of
the limited partners do not constitute taking part in the control of the business. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 620.07 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 96 (McKinney Supp. 1984);
OR. REv. STAT. § 69.280 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-2-107 (Supp. 1984); and TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
66. 6 U.L.A. 246 (West Supp. 1985). Section 303(b) provides:
A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the
meaning of subsection (a) solely by doing one or more of the following:
(1) being a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership or of
a general partner;
(2) consulting with and advising a general partner with respect to the business of
the limited partnership;
(3) acting as surety for the limited partnership;
(4) approving or disapproving an amendment to the partnership agreement; or
(5) voting on one or more of the following matters:
(i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership;
(ii) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or sub-
LIMITED LIABILITY
Notwithstanding the safe harbor for voting on certain matters,
the Commissioners clearly indicated that the possession or exercise
of voting powers by limited partners can, at some undefined point,
rise to the level of taking part in the control of the business within
the meaning of section 303(a). Section 302 of the RULPA provides:
"Subject to Section 303, the partnership agreement may grant to
all or a specified group of the limited partners the right to vote (on
a per capita or other basis) upon any matter. 67 The Commission-
ers' Comment to section 302 explains that "[i]f such [voting] pow-
ers are granted to limited partners beyond the 'safe harbor' of Sec-
tion 303(b)(5), a court may hold that, under the circumstances, the
limited partners have participated in 'control of the business'
within the meaning of Section 303(a). 68
As indicated above, section 303 of the RULPA was a modest
improvement over section 7 of the ULPA. To the extent of the
"safe harbor" provisions of section 303(b), the Commissioners
made clear that certain activities by limited partners did not con-
stitute taking part in the control of the partnership business. On
the other hand, the Commissioners created a new concept, the
"substantially the same as" test, without providing any guidance to
judges or lawyers regarding the meaning of that concept. Further-
more, the Commissioners retained the rule that a limited partner
might incur personal liability for partnership obligations if he took
part in control of the partnership business without resolving the
fundamental problem of discriminating between those non-"safe
harbor" activities that would result in personal liability and those
that would not.
stantially all of the assets of the limited partnership other than in the ordinary
course of its business;
(iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership other than in
the ordinary course of its business;
(iv) a change in the nature of the business; or
(v) the removal of a general partner.
Id. A number of the states that have adopted the RULPA have enacted nonuniform varia-
tions of § 303(b) to expand the number of safe harbor powers or activities available to lim-
ited partners. See ALA. CODE § 10-9A-42 (Supp. 1984); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632 (West Supp.
1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-62-303 (Supp. 1984); Del. Revised Unif. Limited Partnership
Act, H.R. 191, § 17-303 (Apr. 30, 1985) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 545.303 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a203 (1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 449-1303 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 67-251 (Supp. 1982);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 88.19 (Supp. 1985); WASH. RE V. CODE ANN. § 25.10.190 (Supp. 1985).
67. 6 U.L.A. 245 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
68. Id.
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2. New Section 303
In August 1985 the Commissioners approved a number of
amendments to subsections 303(a) and 303(b).69 Although new sec-
tion 303 is considerably longer than its predecessor, the unmistak-
able intent of the Commissioners in recommending to the states
the adoption of the new section is to relax, but not abolish, the
control rule.
Like its predecessor, new section 303(a) contains two
sentences. The first sentence retains the control rule with a small
change in wording: under new section 303(a), a limited partner be-
comes liable for the partnership's obligations if the limited partner
"participates" (rather than "takes part") in the control of the busi-
ness . 0  It seems unlikely that the Commissioners intend any
change in the substance of the control rule by this rephrasing alone
although the reason for this change is not certain. 1
However, the Commissioners significantly amended the second
sentence of section 303(a). New section 303(a) abandons the bifur-
cated liability standard and the confusing "substantially the same
as" test introduced in 1976. Pursuant to the second sentence of
new section 303(a), a limited partner who particiates in the control
69. In addition to approving amendments to § 303, the Commissioners approved
amendments to other sections of the RULPA which, if adopted by the states, should gener-
ally facilitate the use of the limited partnership form by large businesses. The 1985 amend-
ments significantly streamline the certificate of limited partnership by eliminating many of
the matters which the RULPA required to be disclosed in the certificate, by no longer re-
quiring that the certificate be signed by the limited partners (a change that also will relieve
limited partners from potential liability for false statements in the certificate pursuant to
§ 207), and by specifically authorizing the filing of restated certificates. In addition, the
Commissioners amended § 401 of the RULPA to enable partners validly to agree that new
general partners may be admitted to limited partnerships without the contemporaneous
unanimous consent of all the partners. For a discussion of the rule requiring the unanimous
consent of the limited partners for the admission of an additional or substitute general part-
ner, see Basile, Admission of Additional and Substitute General Partners to a Limited
Partnership: A Proposal for Freedom of Contract, 1984 ARiz. ST. L.J. 235.
70. The first sentence of new § 303(a) provides: "Except as provided in subsection (d),
a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a
general partner or, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner,
he participates in the control of the business." UNIP. LIMITED PARTNERSHip ACT § 303(a)
(1985) [hereinafter cited as ULPA (1985)]. Although the ULPA (1985) is not yet available in
published form, it will likely be included in West's 1986 pocket part for volume six of UNi-
FORM LAWS ANNOTATED, which will be distributed in January or February of 1986.
71. A possible reason for the change is to conform the language of new § 303(a) to that
of § 303(b) which used the language "participate" rather than "take part." See supra note
66. At the time of this writing the revised Commissioners' Comments to new § 303 were not
yet available. See supra note 70. The revised Comments may well answer some or all of the
questions raised by this Article concerning new § 303.
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of the business is liable only to persons who transact business with
the limited partnership "reasonably believing, based upon the lim-
ited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general part-
ner."72 The effect of this change should be to reduce substantially
the number of plaintiffs who can qualify to sue a limited partner
for participating in the control of the business.
The Commissioners also amended section 303(b) to add a
number of safe harbor activities in which limited partners may en-
gage without being deemed to participate in the control of the bus-
iness. Among the specific safe harbor activities added by new sec-
tion 303(b) are provisions that allow a limited partner to be an
officer, director, or shareholder of a general partner that is a corpo-
ration; to guarantee or assume one or more specific obligations of
the limited partnership; to take any action required or permitted
by law to bring or pursue a derivative action in the right of the
limited partnership; to request or attend a meeting of partners; to
wind up the limited partnership under certain circumstances; or to
propose, approve or disapprove, by voting or otherwise, the trans-
fer of all or substantially all the partnership's assets (whether or
not in the ordinary course of business), the admission of a general
partner, the admission or removal of a limited partner, or a trans-
action involving an actual or potential conflict of interest between
a general partner and the limited partnership or the limited
partners."3
72. The second sentence of new § 303(a) provides: "However, if the limited partner
particpates in the control of the business, he is liable only to persons who transact business
with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct,
that the limited partner is a general partner." ULPA (1985) § 303(a). See also the Delaware
and California versions of former § 303(a), supra note 63, which also employ a reasonable
reliance test.
73. New § 303(b) provides:
A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the
meaning of subsection (a) solely by doing one or more of the following:
(1) being a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership or of
a general partner, or being an officer, director, or shareholder of a general partner that
is a corporation;
(2) consulting with and advising a general partner with respect to the business of
the limited partnership;
(3) acting as surety for the limited partnership or guaranteeing or assuming one or
more specific obligations of the limited partnership;
(4) taking any action required or permitted by law to bring or pursue a derivative
action in the right of the limited partnership;
(5) requesting or attending a meeting of partners;
(6) proposing, approving, or disapproving, by voting or otherwise, one or more of
the following matters:
(i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership;
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No list of specific safe harbor activities can be complete; one
always can think of at least one more activity in which a limited
partner might wish to engage that would be missing from even the
most carefully crafted safe harbor list. Examples of such activities
that are not on the expanded safe harbor list of new section 303(b)
include proposing, approving, or disapproving the sale or lease of
specific assets, but less than substantially all assets of the partner-
ship; the incurrence of indebtedness in the ordinary course of the
partnership's business; or the refinancing or payment of indebted-
ness.7 In recognition of the inexhaustiveness of the specific safe
harbor list, the Commissioners approved perhaps the most useful
of the amendments to section 303-new section 303(b)(6)(ix). Spe-
cifically, this amendment provides a safe harbor for "proposing,
approving, or disapproving, by voting or otherwise.., matters re-
lated to the business of the limited partnership not otherwise enu-
merated in this subsection (b), which the partnership agreement
states in writing may be subject to the approval or disapproval of
limited partners."
New section 303(b)(6)(ix) is potentially a shallower and foggier
safe harbor than it may appear on first reading. In order to fit
within the protection of this new section, a partnership agreement
provision must satisfy two requirements. First, the provision must
(ii) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or sub-
stantially all of the assets of the limited partnership;
(iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership other than in
the ordinary course of its business;
(iv) a change in the nature of the business;
(v) the admission or removal of a general partner;
(vi) the admission or removal of a limited partner;
(vii) a transaction involving an actual or potential conflict of interest between
a general partner and the limited partnership or the limited partners;
(viii) an amendment to the partnership agreement or certificate of limited
partnership; or
(ix) matters related to the business of the limited partnership not otherwise
enumerated in this subsection (b), which the partnership agreement states in writ-
ing may be subject to the approval or disapproval of limited partners;
(7) winding up the limited partnership pursuant to Section 803; or
(8) exercising any right or power permitted to limited partners under this Act and
not specifically enumerated in this subsection (b).
ULPA § 303(b) (1985).
74. For an example of a state that has included these activities in its safe harbor list,
see Del. Revised Unif. Limited Partnership Act, H.R. 191, § 17-303(b)(8)b-(8)c (Apr. 30,
1985) (to be codified at DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)b-(8)c). Of course, because new
§ 303(b) is a nonexclusive list of safe harbor activities for limited partners, a court neverthe-
less could hold that engaging in one or more of these unlisted activities does not constitute
participation in the control of the business. See supra note 64.
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be "in writing." The writing requirement is not mere surplusage
because the RULPA contemplates oral partnership agreements.
7 5
The policy reason for the writing requirement is not obvious. On
the other hand, this requirement should be easy to satisfy in prac-
tice. Second, the provision must concern a "matter related to the
business of the limited partnership." This latter requirement
means that it may be possible for a written partnership agreement
provision to be outside the safe harbor protection of new section
303(b)(6)(ix) if the provision gives limited partners the right to ap-
prove or disapprove matters that are not related to the business of
the limited partnership.76 In this regard, it is significant that the
Commissioners did not amend section 302, which continues to pro-
vide that partnership agreement voting provisions for limited part-
ners are "[s]ubject to Section 303."'"7
New section 303 is certainly an improvement over its prede-
cessor. The new section discards the former two-tiered standard of
liability under section 303, reduces the potential number of plain-
tiffs about whom limited partners need to worry, and adds some
new safe harbor provisions, including new section 303(b)(6)(ix),
which, if adopted by the states, should be very useful in practice.
On the other hand, by adopting new section 303 the Commission-
ers have manifested their refusal to abandon the time-honored
premise that, at least in some circumstances, a limited partner who
participates in the control of the business must sacrifice the benefit
of limited liability. Retaining even a watered-down version of the
control rule leads inevitably to ambiguity. A careful examination of
the theoretical underpinnings of the control rule demonstrates its
flaws.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE CONTROL RULE
When the Commissioners, in 1916, first recommended the con-
trol rule for imposing liability for partnership obligations on lim-
ited partners, limited partnerships were generally small organiza-
75. See RULPA § 101(9), 6 U.L.A. 217 (West Supp. 1985).
76. Compare Del. Revised Unif. Limited Partnership Act, H.R. 191, § 17-303(b)(8)
(Apr. 30, 1985) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)) (providing a safe
harbor for limited partners who "propose, or approve or disapprove, by voting ... or other-
wise . . . such . . . matters as are stated in the partnership agreement.") (emphasis
added). For further discussion of the failure of § 303(b)(6)(ix) to provide a clear assurance
of limited liability to limited partners engaging in certain practices, see infra text accompa-
nying note 84.
77. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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tions consisting of a few members and conducting business on a
local scale. Under such circumstances, the control rule may have
been relatively unobjectionable. Assuming that there is something
pernicious about limited partners telling a general partner to plant
watermelons, peppers, and eggplant, instead of beans78 (an as-
sumption whose validity is not beyond question), the control rule
may have been appropriate to discourage such officiousness.
Today, however, limited partnerships are often large organiza-
tions consisting of many members and conducting business on an
interstate or even national scale. 9 Modern limited partnerships are
organized by sophisticated promoters as vehicles to raise capital
for major business ventures. Investors can purchase limited part-
nership interests in "orange groves, satellite transponders, timber
stands and movie productions, to name just a few."80 The modern
day limited partner is unlikely to have the occasion, or the desire,
to direct the general partners to plant watermelons. More likely, a
limited partner in a modern limited partnership will seek the right
to exercise control over those decisions that, in the limited part-
ner's judgment, may have a material effect on the value of the lim-
ited partner's investment. Whatever merit the control rule once
had, if the rule has become an obstacle to a limited partner's abil-
ity to negotiate such partnership agreement provisions, then the
rule is ill suited to modern business conditions.
The control rule has spawned at least two unfortunate conse-
quences. First, the rule creates uncertainty for potential limited
partners and their counsel. Specifically, the rule makes it very dif-
ficult for a potential limited partner to know a priori whether part-
nership agreement provisions requiring a general partner to share
decision-making authority with the limited partner (at least those
provisions that are not protected by a clear safe harbor provision)
will result in the limited partner's liability for partnership
obligations.
Consider the following three hypothetical partnership agree-
ment provisions:
(1) a written partnership agreement for a real estate limited partnership
providing that the general partners may not, without the consent of the hold-
78. See Holzman v. de Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948); see also
supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (discussing Holzman).
79. See generally Publicly Traded Limited Partnership: An Emerging Financial Al-
ternative to the Public Corporation, 39 Bus. LAw. 709 (1984).
80. Lipman, Real Estate Syndicators Dream Up Exotic Deals to Win Back Investors,
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1985, at 23, col. 4.
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ers of two-thirds of the limited partnership interests, enter into a long-term
lease for more than twenty-five percent of the partnership's rental space;
(2) a written partnership agreement providing that the partnership is to
be managed by a committee of three persons who may, but need not be, part-
ners and further providing that the management committee is to be elected
by vote of all the partners;
(3) a written partnership agreement providing that the general partners
may not make any charitable contribution without the consent of the holders
of fifty-one percent of the limited partnership interests.
If the limited partners exercised the right to consent or to vote
under any of these provisions, the limited partners literally would
be "taking part" or "participating" in the control of the business
and presumptively would incur liability for the partnership's obli-
gations under section 7 of the ULPA or former or new section
303(a) of the RULPA.8 '
No reported decision has addressed whether a limited part-
ner's possession or exercise of the right to vote or consent pursuant
to such partnership agreement provisions would constitute taking
part in the control of the business within the meaning of the
ULPA or the RULPA. 2 Moreover, the possession or exercise of
such consent or voting rights by a limited partner is not within any
of the safe harbor provisions of section 303(b) of the RULPA. ss
Thus, a lawyer would be hard pressed to opine confidently that,
under the law of a state that has adopted section 7 of the ULPA or
section 303 of the RULPA, a potential limited partner who sought
to negotiate such partnership agreement provisions would not risk
incurring liability for partnership obligations.
Unfortunately, even the adoption by the states of new section
303 may not clarify the limited partner's situation in every case. A
lawyer drafting a partnership agreement for a limited partnership
organized under the laws of such a state might argue that each of
81. As indicated in the text accompanying notes 59-63, if the limited partnership were
organized under the laws of a state that has adopted § 303(a), assuming that the decision to
give or to withhold consent pursuant to the partnership agreement provisions is not "sub-
stantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner," the limited partners
would be liable, if at all, only "to persons who transact business with the partnership with
actual knowledge of [the limited partner's] participation in control." RULPA § 303(a), 6
U.L.A. 246 (West Supp. 1985). Furthermore, as indicated in supra notes 51, 63 & 72, if the
limited partnership were organized in California, Delaware, Texas, or a state that adopts
new § 303(a), the limited partners would be liable, if at all, only "to persons who transact
business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner." ULPA (1985) § 303(a).
82. Indeed, as pointed out supra note 53, in the majority of jurisdictions there is no
reported decision of any kind interpreting the control rule. But see Strang v. Thomas, supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 66.
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the provisions would be within the safe harbor of new section
303(b)(6)(ix). That argument should prevail with respect to the
first provision, but with respect to the second and third provisions
the result is not clear. A creditor may argue that neither provision
is a "matter related to the business of the limited partnership." By
its terms new section 303(b)(6)(ix) seems intended to enable lim-
ited partners to obtain the right to propose or to veto transactional
decisions specified in the partnership agreement such as entering
into a lease, transferring an asset, or making a loan. In contrast,
the election of a management committee relates to the selection of
the managers of the partnership's affairs but not to any specific
business decision. 4 The third hypothetical provision is even more
troublesome because the making of charitable contributions is by
definition not the "business of the limited partnership."
One final hypothetical demonstrates the futility of trying to
"fix" the control rule by redrafting it. Suppose that two persons
form a limited partnership pursuant to a written partnership
agreement which contains the following provision: "The general
partner shall not commit the limited partnership to any matter re-
lated to the business of the limited partnership without the prior
approval of the limited partner." From the foregoing discussion, it
is clear that such a provision would seriously risk running afoul of
section 7 of the ULPA or former section 303 of the RULPA. How-
ever, the provision would literally be sheltered by the safe harbor
of new section 303(b)(6)(ix). The question is whether a court would
so construe this new section. If new section 303(b)(6)(ix) really
does shelter such a provision, one wonders why the Commissioners
bothered to retain the control rule at all. On the other hand, if, as
one suspects, such a provision is beyond the intent of new section
303(b) (6) (ix), one is left with the question of how close one can
draft to such a provision without losing the benefit of the new sec-
tion. For example, would new section 303(b)(6)(ix) protect a writ-
ten partnership agreement provision that read, "The general part-
ner shall not commit the limited partnership to any matter
relating to the business of the limited partnership involving the
expenditure of more than $1,000,000 without the prior approval of
the limited partner"? What if the threshold were reduced to
$10,000? $100? A limited partner who approaches the "safe har-
84. Even if the right to vote in the election of a management committee would be
sheltered by new § 303(b)(6)(ix), heaven help the limited partner with the hubris to be
elected to the committee.
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bor" of new section 303(b)(6)(ix) should be prepared to encounter
the tricky currents and hidden shoals created by the retention of
the control rule.
Both academicians and practitioners have bemoaned the con-
trol rule's inherent uncertainty. Professor Alan Feld has observed
that "[t]he control test . . . presents substantial interpretive
problems in cases falling between the extreme of the wholly pas-
sive investor and the partner who manages the business on a day-
to-day basis. ' 5 Messrs. George Coleman and David Weatherbie of
the Texas bar have stated that in their experience "[p]robably the
most serious problem encountered in drafting and carrying out a
limited partnership agreement is that of determining what consti-
tutes taking part 'in the control of the business' of a limited part-
nership . . . .[S]ome recent cases in attempting to solve the issue
have only made it worse."8 Professor Alan Bromberg offered the
following comment on this unhappy situation:
Neither the [ULPA] nor the decisions under it are very helpful on the critical
question of how much review, advisory, management selection, or veto power
a limited partner may have without being regarded as taking part in control.
The resulting uncertainty is probably the greatest drawback of the limited
partnership form.
8 7
The control rule's uncertainty could be mitigated in large part
if state legislatures adopted new section 303(a), the second sen-
tence of which codifies the specific reliance test. If personal liabil-
ity were imposed only upon a limited partner whose conduct
caused a creditor to believe mistakenly that the limited partner
was a general partner, then limited partners with partnership
agreement voting rights over specific types of decisions by general
partners should have less cause for concern. A creditor probably
could not demonstrate that the possession or exercise of a limited
partner's voting rights caused the creditor to mistake the limited
partner for a general partner (although the limited partner's risk
escalates the closer he comes to the type of sweeping partnership
agreement provision discussed above). By engrafting a specific reli-
ance test, however, onto new section 303(a), the Commissioners
have made all of new section 303 either totally superfluous or terri-
bly confusing.
85. Feld, supra note 8, at 1473.
86. Coleman & Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30
Sw. L.J. 887, 897 (1976) (footnote omitted).




Even if a state were to repeal its version of section 7 or section
303 and decline to adopt new section 303, the specific reliance test
would remain as part of the law of limited partnerships. Any per-
son holding himself out as a general partner may be held liable to a
creditor who acts in reliance on such representation under section
16(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA):ss
When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents
himself, or consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in
an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is
liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made, who
has, on the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent
partnership, and if he has made such representation or consented to its being
made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the representa-
tion has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving
credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the represen-
tation or consenting to its being made.89
Because the UPA applies to limited partnerships to the extent that
the ULPA or the RULPA does not provide inconsistent rules,90
without regard to new section 303(a), a limited partner who holds
himself out as a general partner "by words . . . or by conduct" is
personally liable to a creditor of the limited partnership who has
extended credit "on the faith" of such representation.91 If new sec-
tion 303(a) says no more than section 16(1) of the UPA already
provides, the new section is at best redundant.92 On the other
hand, if the Commissioners intend by new section 303(a) some-
thing other than what is already provided by section 16(1) of the
UPA, then the meaning of the new section is elusive indeed.
In addition to the uncertainty that the control rule creates,
the rule further disadvantages limited partners by giving general
partners a potent weapon in negotiations over partnership agree-
ment provisions. When limited partners seek partnership agree-
ment provisions requiring general partners to share managerial au-
thority with the limited partners, counsel for the general partners
88. The Commissioners approved the UPA in 1914, and 49 states (Louisiana is the
only exception), the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Guam have adopted the
act.
89. 6 U.L.A. 195 (1969).
90. UPA § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969) ("[T]his act shall apply to limited partnerships
except in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith.");
RULPA § 1105, 6 U.L.A. 290 (West Supp. 1985) ("In any case not provided for in this Act
the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act govern.").
91. See also Barrows v. Joseph F. Downs & Co., 9 R.I. 446, 454 (1870) (holding on the
basis of common law principles that a limited partner who represented himself to be a gen-
eral partner was personally liable to creditors of the partnership).
92. Cf. Abrams, supra note 8, at 804-05.
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can brandish the sword of personal liability to frighten off the lim-
ited partners and their counsel. Given the uncertain meaning of
section 7 and both former and new section 303(a), this sword, dull
though it may be, is likely to have the intended intimidating effect.
Academic commentators and practicing lawyers have noted
the control rule's usefulness to well-advised general partners. Prior
to the promulgation of the RULPA, 3 Professor Feld suggested
that "counsel could not confidently permit a regular practice of
'advice'" by a limited partner with a significant investment in a
limited partnership when the "advice" may, "as a practical matter,
[take on] the color of a command in the partnership. 94 Mr. Barry
Feldman of the Connecticut bar has concluded that the absence of
litigation in this area reflects limited partners' concern with exert-
ing too much control over partnership business.9 Mr. Feldman
further added: "The uncertainty caused by the ambiguity of Sec-
tion 7 and the inconsistent constructions thereof, and the extreme
caution of the limited partners are severe limitations and deter-
rents to the formation of limited partnerships."9 Similarly, Mr.
Stephen Burr of the Massachusetts bar, after reviewing the state of
the law under section 7 and section 303, concluded, "[F]ew gener-
alizations are possible, and lawyers [who represent limited part-
ners] are well advised in counseling their clients to err on the side
of caution.
'9 7
The general partners of the world may well argue that they are
entitled to relatively unfettered control of the business of the part-
nership as consideration for their assumption of personal liability
for the partnership's obligations. Conceding the persuasiveness of
this argument, one nevertheless may ask why the issue of general
partners' compensation for the risk of personal liability should be
the subject of a mandatory rule of law rather than part of the ne-
gotiation process among the partners.
In view of the disadvantages of the control rule, one would as-
sume that some strong, countervailing policy considerations sup-
port its continued existence. Courts and commentators have sug-
93. Both § 303(b)(2) of the RULPA and new § 303(b)(2) of the ULPA (1985) create a
"safe harbor" for limited partners who merely advise a general partner with respect to the
business of the limited partnership. See supra notes 66 & 73.
94. Feld, supra note 8, at 1477.
95. Feldman, supra note 8, at 213; see also supra note 53.
96. Feldman, supra note 8, at 213.
97. Burr, The Potential Liability of Limited Partners as General Partners, 67 MAsS.
L. REv. 22, 29 (1982).
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gested four reasons for the rule. The most frequently stated
justification for the control rule is that it protects creditors from
mistaking a limited partner who is active in the management of
the partnership's business for a general partner.9 8
At the outset it should be noted that a creditor who mistakes a
limited partner for a general partner is not necessarily harmed by
this mistake. The creditor is harmed only when the creditor mis-
takes a limited partner for a general partner and extends credit to
the partnership based upon the credit-worthiness of that limited
partner, and the partnership thereafter defaults. Viewed in this
light, the control rule is neither well suited nor necessary to pro-
tect creditors.
If the purpose of section 7 and section 303(a) is to protect
creditors from being misled, it is odd that neither provision by its
terms requires that a creditor seeking recovery from a limited part-
ner actually believe, or even have reason to believe, that the lim-
ited partner is a general partner 9 A person who becomes a credi-
tor of the partnership as a result of slipping and falling at the
partnership's place of business could, under the law of states that
have adopted section 7 or section 303, look to a limited partner
who takes part in the control of the business. In this situation, the
control rule does not protect the creditor's expectations regarding
the limited partner's liability because the creditor has no such ex-
pectations. Furthermore, although new section 303(a) requires that
the plaintiff reasonably believe, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner, the new sec-
tion seeks to protect too large a class of creditors. If the section
were designed to protect those creditors who arguably needed pro-
tection, new section 303(a) would restrict the potential plaintiffs to
those creditors who have extended credit in reliance on the
creditworthiness of a limited partner whom the creditor mistook to
be a general partner.100 In any event, as noted above, if a limited
partner actually held himself out as a general partner, the limited
98. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32 & 49; see also Feld, supra note 8, at
1479; Sell, An Examination of Articles 3, 4 and 9 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 459, 463 (1978).
99. Compare the Texas version of § 7 and the California and Delaware versions of
§ 303(a), supra notes 51 & 63, respectively.
100. Cf. Del. Revised Unif. Limited Partnership Act, H.R. 191, § 17-304(b) (Apr. 30,
1985) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-304(b)) (making a general partner who
erroneously and in good faith believes he is a limited partner liable as a general partner only
to those third parties who believed in good faith that he was a general partner and extended
credit to the partnership in reasonable reliance on that partner's credit).
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partner could be held liable as a general partner under section
16(1) of the UPA.101
Finally, justifying the control rule on creditor protection
grounds implicitly assumes that creditors of limited partnerships
form expectations regarding the personal liability of the agents of
the partnership with whom the creditors deal. Whether limited
partnership creditors in fact form such expectations is highly
questionable.
For purposes of testing this assumption, one can divide credi-
tors into three groups. One group consists of tort creditors-those
persons who become creditors of a limited partnership as the result
of a compensable injury to their persons or property. As demon-
strated by the foregoing hypothetical, these persons typically be-
come creditors involuntarily and thus have no expectations regard-
ing the personal liability of the partners. A second group consists
of institutional creditors, such as banks. These creditors typically
are represented by counsel who, prior to the extension of credit to
the partnership, will review a number of legal documents, includ-
ing the certificate of limited partnership. Institutional creditors,
therefore, know precisely against whom they will have recourse in
the event of default by the limited partnership; 1 2 the identity of
the persons who purport to take part in the control of the partner-
ship business does not mold these creditors' expectations. The
third group consists of trade creditors who supply goods or services
to the partnership on credit. Although I know of no relevant em-
pirical study, it seems highly doubtful that a person who agrees to
sell 500 widgets to a limited partnership on thirty days' credit does
so with the expectation that the person who places the order will
be liable for the debt. On the contrary, because section 102(1) of
the RULPA 10 3 requires that the name of a limited partnership or-
ganized under the act contain the words "limited partnership," the
trade creditor is more likely to assume that the debtor is a limited
liability entity. Trade creditors are far more likely to protect them-
selves by asking for credit agency ratings and by refusing to deal
with slow paying customers than by relying on the assumption that
they will be able to attach the personal assets of the individuals
101. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
102. The certificate of limited partnership must disclose, inter alia, the name and ad-
dress of each general partner. ULPA § 2(1)(a) IV., 6 U.L.A. 568 (1969); RULPA § 201(a), 6
U.L.A. 230 (West Supp. 1985).
103. 6 U.L.A. 220 (West Supp. 1985).
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who appear to be taking part in the control of the business.'0 4
A second justification for the control rule was suggested by
Clement Bates, a nineteenth century commentator on the law of
limited partnerships. Bates theorized:
The public are entitled to have the business conducted under the uncon-
trolled judgment and skill of the general partner; for they may not have been
willing to trust the firm where the general partner or the business is governed
by the special partner. Doubtless this is the reason why the special partner is
liable in solido for an interference, even if it be secret and unknown to the
public.'05
Initially, one might wonder what Bates meant by his reference to
the "public." Conceivably, he may have intended to describe the
public in general, potential creditors of a limited partnership, or
actual creditors of a limited partnership. In any event, Bates evi-
dently believed that some persons other than the partners had a
legally protected interest in the identity of the individuals who
managed the partnership business. One searches the UPA, the
ULPA, and the RULPA in vain, however, for any evidence of such
a legally protected interest. A general partner has the power uni-
laterally to withdraw from a limited partnership at will, regardless
of the terms of the partnership agreement.106 An additional or sub-
stitute general partner may not be admitted to the limited partner-
ship without the consent of all the limited partners, 1'07 but the law
does not require the consent of any creditor. Moreover, under the
RULPA, a vote by limited partners to remove a general partner
does not constitute participation in the control of the business
within the meaning of either former or new section 303(a).108 The
Commissioners' drafting, therefore, consistently reflects the con-
clusion that the identity of the partnership's managers is the busi-
ness of no one except the partners. 09
A third possible rationale for the control rule is that those
whose participation in the management of a business causes its in-
solvency should be personally liable to the injured creditors. Be-
cause the management of a limited partnership is the responsibil-
ity of the general partners, they are personally liable to the
creditors of the partnership. When limited partners participate in
104. See B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 91-94 (2d ed. 1981).
105. C. BATES, supra note 10, at 133.
106. UPA § 31, 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969); RULPA § 602, 6 U.L.A. 260 (West Supp. 1985).
107. ULPA § 9(1)(e), 6 U.L.A. 586 (1969); RULPA § 401, 6 U.L.A. 252 (West Supp.
1985). But see supra note 69.
108. See supra notes 66 & 73.
109. See Hecker, supra note 57, at 51.
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the control of the partnership's business and insolvency ensues,
this theory holds the meddling limited partners personally lia-
ble. 110 Although this explanation for the control rule may appeal to
one's sense of retributive justice, it is hardly a bedrock principle of
American business law that managerial power goes hand in hand
with personal liability. For example, although the business and af-
fairs of a corporation are managed by, or perhaps under the direc-
tion of, the board of directors,"' the members of the board, even
when they are stockholders, generally are not personally liable for
the obligations of the corporation. Indeed, courts ordinarily will re-
fuse to review the merits of a good faith business decision of the
board of directors of a corporation, even when a stockholder claims
that the decision resulted in a loss to the corporation." 2 Why per-
sonal liability should be the price of managerial power in the case
of a limited partnership and not in the corporate context defies
comprehension.
Finally, one commentator has suggested that the control rule
is justified as a prophylactic against the improvidence of the lim-
ited partners:
Principles of sound business practice would seem to dictate that the control
of the management of a business should repose in those who shoulder the
greatest risk of financial loss in the event of business failure. Theoretically at
least, a person guaranteed a limited liability to business creditors would, if
allowed to direct and control the destinies of the business, be inclined to
favor speculative ventures to the possible detriment of his associates upon
whom the law imposes unlimited personal liability.
11 3
This explanation for the control rule is flawed for two reasons.
First, it simply does not follow that a limited partner who is im-
mune from personal liability has nothing to lose if, by participating
in the control of the business, the limited partner causes the busi-
ness to fail. The limited partner has an equity investment at stake
and the risk of business failure presumably will deter the limited
partner from running amok. Second, the deterrence of speculative
ventures is not a policy that sustains any rule of American business
law. Indeed, there are obvious policy reasons why the law is not so
oriented.
110. Id.; Abrams, supra note 8, at 796, 808-11.
111. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
112. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 IlM. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); Kamin
v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 54
A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976).
113. Bayse, A Survey of the Limited-Partnership Form of Business Organization, 42
OR. L. REv. 35, 49 (1962).
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In short, as one commentator observed, no "explicit theoreti-
cal basis for the liability imposed by section 7, ''114 former section
303(a), or new section 303(a) justifies the control rule's continued
vitality. Indeed, in view of the lack of any sound theoretical reason
for the control rule, one legitimately wonders why the Commission-
ers have consistently striven so mightily to retain it. The rule im-
posing personal liability on a limited partner who takes part in the
control of the business of the partnership is supported by nothing
but its own hoariness.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE CONTROL RULE
Despite the disadvantages of the control rule and the lack of a
compelling rationale for its retention, commentators have not gen-
erally urged its abolition. Of the few who have even suggested that
the rule should be repealed, most have done so almost parentheti-
cally and with the feeling that the quest may be quixotic.
1 5
Although the Commissioners have recommended to the states
an erosion of the control rule by the approval of new section 303
and, therefore, have taken a positive step in reforming limited
partnership law, there is no sound reason to retain any remnant of
the rule. The control rule should be abolished. Because limited lia-
bility is a significant inducement to investment in limited partner-
ships, potential limited partners must be able to assess accurately
the risk of personal liability for the obligations of a particular part-
nership. Not surprisingly, in the almost seventy years that the con-
trol rule has been part of the law of American limited partnerships,
courts have been unable to articulate an interpretation of the rule
that enables potential limited partnership investors and their
counsel to make that assessment confidently." 6
The fault lies not with the courts but with the drafters of the
limited partnership statutes who have laid an impossible task at
114. Hecker, supra note 57, at 47.
115. See Donnell, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 18
AM. Bus. L.J. 399, 409 (1980); Kempin, The Problem of Control in Limited Partnership
Law: An Analysis and Recommendation, 22 AK. Bus. L.J. 443, 465-66 (1985); Kessler, The
New Uniform Limited Partnership Act: A Critique, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 159, 166-67 (1979);
Comment, Limited Partner Control and Liability Under the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 32 Sw. L.J. 1301, 1326 (1979).
116. The specific reliance test approved by the Commissioners in new § 303(a) may, if
enacted by the states, enable limited partnership investors and their counsel to predict more
accurately the outcome of potential disputes arising under new § 303(a), but the specific
reliance test either makes new § 303 essentially superfluous or renders the section hopelessly
confusing. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
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the courthouse steps. If, as Professor Lewis asserted, the Commis-
sioners intended in 1916 to propose a statute that would enable
investors in limited partnerships to invest with the same sense of
freedom from potential personal liability that stockholders en-
joy,1 1 7 the Commissioners should have done so. The time has come
for the Commissioners (or the individual state legislatures) finally
to clarify this needlessly confused area of the law by abolishing the
control rule.
The drafting necessary to effect this reform is quite simple.
The legislatures need only replace the local version of section 7 or
subsections 303(a), (b), and (c) " 8 with the following provision:
Limited partners shall not be personally liable for the payment of the
limited partnership's debts except if they are also general partners or as they
may be liable by reason of their own acts." 9
The principal advantage of the proposed statute is the elimi-
nation of the disadvantages of the control rule. Under the pro-
posed statute, potential limited partners who seek to negotiate the
right to exercise control over general partners' decisions would not
risk incurring personal liability as a result of possessing or exercis-
ing those control rights. Moreover, negotiations between general
partners and limited partners over the allocation of managerial
power no longer would be stacked in favor of the general partners
by a mandatory rule of law.
Under the proposed statute, a limited partner would not be
absolutely immune from liability for the obligations of the partner-
ship just as stockholders are not absolutely immune from liability
for corporate obligations. A limited partner could become liable for
the obligations of the partnership under three circumstances. First,
a limited partner would be personally liable for the obligations of
the partnership if he were also a general partner. 20 Second, a lim-
ited partner could become liable for the obligations of the partner-
117. See supra text accompanying note 33.
118. This Article takes no position on whether limited partners should continue to
have potential liability under §§ 5 and 6 of the ULPA or §§ 207 or 303(d) of the RULPA.
See supra notes 4 & 69. If the decision were made to retain the rules of those sections, some
minor tinkering with the statute proposed in the text would be necessary.
119. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (1983) (using similar language to denote
when stockholders or members of a corporation are personally liable for payment of the
corporation's debts).
120. Both the ULPA and the RULPA expressly provide that a person can be both a
limited partner and a general partner at the same time. ULPA § 12, 6 U.L.A. 596 (1969);
RULPA § 404, 6 U.L.A. 256 (West Supp. 1985). In practice general partners often purchase
limited partnership interests for investment.
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ship by his own acts. For example, a limited partner expressly
could agree to be personally liable by guaranteeing the partner-
ship's obligations. In addition, if a limited partner were employed
by the partnership and committed a tort while acting within the
scope of that employment, both the partnership (under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior) and the limited partner as tortfeasor
would be liable for any obligations to the victim of the tort. Third,
a court could ignore the statute and impose personal liability on a
limited partner when required by equity under the standards that
courts sometimes use to impose personal liability on stockholders
by "piercing the corporate veil." '121
At least three possible objections might be raised to the pro-
posed statute. The first is that the proposed statute goes too far.
Under the proposed statute, a limited partner could secure part-
nership agreement control provisions relating to significant busi-
ness decisions and also interfere to the extent of ordering the gen-
eral partners to plant watermelons instead of beans. The answer to
this objection is: "Let them plant watermelons." As argued above,
no good reason exists for precluding limited partners from day-to-
day participation in the control of the partnership business. Credi-
tors are not likely to have reasonable expectations about the per-
sonal liability of limited partners regardless of the degree of the
limited partners' involvement in the business, 2 and if a limited
partner were actually to hold herself out as general partner, the
limited partner would be subject to section 16(1) of the UPA.123
The second possible objection to the proposed statute is that
limited partnerships could be formed and operated with inade-
quate capitalization to the detriment of creditors; limited partners
could form a limited partnership with a very small investment, em-
ploying a single corporate general partner with few assets. Credi-
tors of such a partnership would be left to squable over a very
small pot of assets and would have no effective right to seek recov-
ery against any partner.
There are three answers to this objection. First, the asserted
evil is not unique to the proposed statute. Neither the ULPA nor
the RULPA as presently written contains any provision imposing
personal liability on the limited partners of undercapitalized lim-
ited partnerships, provided that the limited partners do not take
121. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
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part in the control of the business. The control rule is not, and was
not intended to be, an effective prophylactic against the possible
formation of thinly capitalized limited partnerships. Second, the
Treasury Department's regulations under the Internal Revenue
Code make it unlikely as a practical matter that such a partnership
would be formed. Under those regulations, if the corporate general
partner does not have substantial assets that could be reached by a
creditor of the partnership, other than its interest in the partner-
ship, the limited partnership has the corporate characteristic of
limited liability,124 thus jeopardizing the treatment of the organiza-
tion as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. 12 5 Finally,
courts would have no difficulty in dealing with such an abuse.
Courts have not hesitated to impose personal liability upon stock-
holders of a corporation that is grossly undercapitalized when nec-
essary to avoid injustice. 126 Presumably the courts would address
abusive limited partnerships in a similar manner.
Finally, it may be argued that a limited partnership formed
under the proposed statute would look so much like a corporation
that the partnership would be treated as a corporation, rather than
as a partnership, for federal income tax purposes. Undoubtedly, if
the proposed statute created this result, the attractiveness of the
limited partnership as an investment vehicle would be seriously
undermined. Nevertheless, under present Treasury regulations, the
proposed statute should not lead to this result.
For a limited partnership to be treated as a partnership rather
than as a corporation for federal income tax purposes, the Trea-
sury's regulations require that the partnership have no more than
two of the following four corporate characteristics: 27 continuity of
124. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 416. The Internal
Revenue Service will not issue an advance ruling that such an organization will be treated as
a partnership for federal income tax purposes unless the net worth of the general partner
(excluding its interest in the partnership and accounts and notes receivable from and paya-
ble to the partnership) is at least (a) the lesser of $250,000 or 15% of the total contributions
to the partnership if total contributions to the partnership are less than $2,500,000 or (b)
10% of the total contributions to the partnership if total contributions to the partnership
are $2,500,000 or more. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
126. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641
(1961); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957);
Western Rock Co. v. Davis, 432 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
127. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1985). Of course, Congress could alter the present
classification rules by statute. The Treasury recently proposed legislation that, if enacted,
would treat limited partnerships with more than 35 limited partners as corporations for
federal income tax purposes. See 2 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIR-
NESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 146-50 (1984).
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life,128 free transferability of interests,'129 limited liability, °30 and
centralization of management. 13' Clearly the proposed statute
would not result in a partnership's having the corporate character-
istics of continuity of life or free transferability of interests. With
respect to limited liability, the Treasury's regulations provide that
a limited partnership does not have the corporate characteristic of
limited liability if the partnership has at least one partner with
personal liability for the partnership's obligations. 132 The regula-
tions specifically provide that in the case of a limited partnership,
personal liability exists with respect to each general partner other
than general partners that are corporations without substantial as-
sets. 33 Thus, the personal liability of the general partners (which
would not be affected by the proposed statute), not the potential
personal liability of the limited partners, prevents the organization
from possessing the corporate characteristic of limited liability.
Regarding centralization of management, most tax lawyers
would concede that the typical modern limited partnership, which
has many limited partners and in which managerial authority is
concentrated in one or a few general partners, has the corporate
characteristic of centralized management.' By contrast, under the
proposed statute, limited partners would be free to negotiate for as
much management authority as they could wrest from the general
partners without the risk of incurring personal liability for the ob-
ligations of the partnership. As a result, some limited partnerships
organized under the proposed statute may actually lack the corpo-
rate characteristic of centralized management and, therefore, could
have fewer corporate characteristics than limited partnerships
presently organized under the ULPA and the RULPA.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule imposing personal liability on limited partners who
take part in the control of the business of the partnership creates
planning problems for limited partners and prejudices the ability
128. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 414.
129. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 417.
130. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 416.
131. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 415.
132. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 416.
133. Id.
134. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 415. As noted in the
text, however, having as many as two corporate characteristics will not result in a limited
partnership's being treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
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of limited partners to negotiate for a meaningful voice in the man-
agement of the business of the partnership. This cost is not justi-
fied by any benefit not obtainable under other existing legal doc-
trines. Therefore, while the adoption of new section 303 by the
states generally would be a positive step in the direction of limited
partnership law reform, there is little to gain from retention of the
control rule and much to be said for its outright abandonment.

